14 December 2008

Thomas Jefferson on the national debt and a balanced budget article


"We believe--or we act as if we believed--that although an individual father cannot alienate the labor of his son, the aggregate body of fathers may alienate the labor of all their sons, of their posterity, in the aggregate, and oblige them to pay for all the enterprises, just or unjust, profitable or ruinous, into which our vices, our passions or our personal interests may lead us. But I trust that this proposition needs only to be looked at by an American to be seen in its true point of view, and that we shall all consider ourselves unauthorized to saddle posterity with our debts, and morally bound to pay them ourselves; and consequently within what may be deemed the period of a generation, or the life of the majority." ME 13:357

"Ought not then the right of each successive generation to be guaranteed against the dissipations and corruptions of those preceding, by a fundamental provision in our Constitution? And if that has not been made, does it exist the less, there being between generation and generation as between nation and nation no other law than that of nature? And is it the less dishonest to do what is wrong because not expressly prohibited by written law? Let us hope our moral principles are not yet in that stage of degeneracy, and that in instituting the system of finance to be hereafter pursued we shall adopt the only safe, the only lawful and honest one, of borrowing on such short terms of reimbursement of interest and principal as will fall within the accomplishment of our own lives." ME 13:360

Thomas Jefferson, “Letter: Thomas Jefferson to John Wayles Eppes”, Thomas Jefferson on Politics & Government (1813).

http://etext.virginia.edu/jefferson/quotations/jeffcont.htm


Of course, Mr. Jefferson is right. We should not saddle our children with our debts and we are morally bound not to do so.

Economic theory, and common sense, says there are times when government must borrow and intervene in the economy, and there is wisdom in doing so. Certainly this is true in times of national crises such as wars or extraordinary disorder in the economy such as we now face.

Equally, prudence, and common sense, says that any borrowing and intervention should be carefully considered and tailored to the problem to be addressed. Now it is true that it isn’t likely, certainly not in extraordinary times, that those who propose action and measures to deal with problems and those who must approve the funds to support whatever steps are to be taken can foresee and calculate accurately what is necessary to overcome the difficulties before us. But in the present situation one can readily see the ongoing confusion and it is not comforting. After all, in the short space of a few months, several sets of alternative policies have been implemented and abandoned. Given this record, one has to wonder if the fiscal and monetary authorities of this country have any idea as to what their strategy for stabilizing the financial system and reviving the economy might be.

The latest “idea” might be called “Spectacularly Big Money”, the suggestion that the Federal government spend as much as a trillion dollars on infrastructure and other government handouts to “put people back to work”. It is further suggested that this spending be financed by borrowing and not taxation.

We all hope this aggressive increase in spending will in fact help the present situation and we will finally be able to declare victory over the forces of economic stagnation and decline. At the same time, we can say with certainty the proposed stimulus package will increase the deficit greatly and add to the burden of the next generation. Hope I am wrong, but for reasons I cannot quite explain, somehow I feel this is not going to be one of the times that a stimulus package is going to work its wonder.

At times like this I wish the Founders had not trusted to moral principles and instead added a balanced budget article to the Constitution.

13 December 2008

Documentation for Historical Estimates of World Trends


HISTORICAL ESTIMATES OF WORLD ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, POPULATION AND LABOR FORCE, 1950-2007

A Data Book of annual historical estimates of long-term trends in the world economy is now available. Data in the Data Book include GDP, total population, and total labor force by main world region from 1950 to 2007 and estimates per capita and per economically active person. It may be obtained by sending an e-mail to Douglas O. Walker at dougwal@regent.edu.

The individual country estimates upon which the region and world totals are based may also be obtained upon request.

Documentation on the data are provided below.

General Note on the Data

This Data Book presents tables relating to long-term trends in the world economic activity, population and labor force and its major economic regions and individual countries. It is based on an update of individual country national accounts estimates and demographic data assembled from United Nations agencies and other national and international sources. Estimates presented here are part of a larger data base now under preparation intended to cover the main demographic, economic, and social trends in the world economy from 1950 to the present.

The historical data on gross product by major expenditure component, population and labor force, upon which the statistical tables are based, have been drawn from original data reported by national and international statistical and research units. The national accounts data conform in general with the United Nations System of National Accounts as presented in the publication System of National Accounts 1993, as collected on a United Nations Statistics Division questionnaire and published in its annual National Accounts Statistics publication. Data collected by the Statistics Division on its questionnaire have been supplemented by the Statistics Division, where possible, to cover the period 1970-2006 for those years and countries for which official data are not available. Where available and necessary, the Statistics Division estimates have been further supplemented by estimates reported by United Nations regional commissions, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other sources so as to arrive at a more complete set of data for the period 1950-2006. Selected series for main world regions have been extended to 2007 on the basis of preliminary estimates and forecasts.

The population and labor force data are based on those reported by the Population Division of the United Nations and the International Labour Organization, as further supplemented and adjusted to cover the period 1950-2007.

It must be emphasized that the present set of the national accounts data base is preliminary in three ways. First, it draws mainly upon readily available statistical material obtained from international agencies in machine-readable form. Statistical data in country publications and agency reports have been used only the to extent they were needed to fill gaps in detail or check on broad trends. Where gaps could not be filled, interpolations were used in some cases. Second, estimates for some countries are based on proxy indicators such as known historical shares, available price series, interpolations and extrapolations of similar series, or other approximations. Third, assumptions were made in the case of some countries about trends in individual components of the GDP, and/or individual components in some countries were estimated by residual. For all of these reasons, and others, the present national accounts data based should be regarded as a first draft, presented here to gain a idea of broad trends in the world economy and elicit comment and suggestions for revision and improvement.

Data presented in this data book are the responsibility of the compiler of the data, Douglas O. Walker, and should not be attributed to the basic sources from which they have been derived or to Regent University. The data have been prepared for use in analytical studies undertaken the compiler of the data bas, his students, and colleagues involved in academic research endeavors. They are not intended for commercial sale and may not be disseminated for any purpose beyond academic research and teaching.


Gross Domestic Product Data

The Data Book presents estimates of total gross domestic product in billions of constant 1990 U.S. dollars for the world and its major economic regions and main geographic areas for the period 1950-2007. The estimates of total GDP are taken from a set of individual country time-series for GDP by expenditure and GDP by main producing sector in current and constant 1990 national currency prepared by the United Nations as part of its National Accounts Main Aggregates Database.

The original country data relating to gross domestic product and its detail in this database have been drawn, wherever possible, from replies by governments to the annual Statistics Division questionnaire on the national accounts. The form and concepts of the data collected on this questionnaire generally agree with the recommendations of the 1993 United Nations System of National Accounts (System of National Accounts, Studies in Methods, Series F, No. 2, Rev. 4) or its predecessor SNAs.

In the first instance, for the period 1970-2006, estimates on the questionnaire have been supplemented by the Statistics Division, where necessary, by estimates prepared by the Statistics Division for missing countries, items, and years on the basis of information from other international agencies, particularly the United Nations regional commissions, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. Further information on the methodology of data estimation used by the Statistics Division may be found on its web site.

In the second instance, the Statistics Division estimates have been further adjusted or complemented, as needed, by the author of the data book, using generally accepted statistical techniques so as to arrive at comprehensive sets of internationally standardized national accounts statistics for the period 1950-2006 (data for some countries and regions are only available beginning in later years). When unavailable from national and international sources, the series for GDP were backdated to 1950 on the basis of data from "The Conference Board and Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Total Economy Database (January 2008)”. This database and information on its sources and methods can be found at http://www.conference-board.org/economics"

In the third instance, key data series have been extended to 2007 on the basis of preliminary estimates and forecasts available from international agencies in August 2008.

Method of preparation of the GDP data. Although in general the basic set of original data reported by countries on the Statistics Division questionnaire conform to international recommendations, in some instances they have gaps in coverage or are in other respects unsuitable for immediate analytical use. In these cases, it was necessary to bring together data from alternative sources and further edit and supplement the questionnaire data. Estimates in other Statistical Division files and from the United Nations regional commissions and agencies and national publications have been used by the Statistics Division and the author to complete the basic set of data obtained from the questionnaire. To ensure comparability, where required and possible, supplementary estimates for each country have been adjusted where possible to conform with the United Nations' SNA.

In some cases, reported data from various sources are in current prices and constant prices in national currency. In others, basic source data are available only in current prices in national currency. For some countries, basic source data are available only for certain years and/or major expenditure components. Supplementary data to the basic set from the questionnaire are available from the other reporting agencies mentioned above in current prices and constant prices in national currency and as price indices for individual expenditure components.

Where data from a supplementary source conformed to that reported by the Statistical Division and was available for a longer period or in greater detail, it was used to complete or extend the primary set of data obtained from the questionnaire. Where available supplementary data did not conform to the primary set of data, adjustments were made in an attempt to prepare a comparable time-series. In addition, in some cases, separate time-series at current and constant prices have been adjusted to insure temporal comparability, and where necessary constant price data have been shifted to a 1990 base in order that data for different countries may be presented at the prices of some common reference year. Further information on sources and methods of preparation of the Statistical Division national accounts data is given on the Statistics Division web site.

In order to prepare the data in the present file, a review was made of the Statistics Division data. These estimates were compared with those available from other international agencies, national sources, and academic research units. In the case of some countries, IMF or World Bank data were substituted for Statistics Division estimates and used as the basic set of data. When identified, miscoding and errors of data entry were corrected. In addition, the resulting set of data were backdated to 1950 or 1960 on the basis of data from other international agencies. In some cases, when data were missing from all reporting sources for some years or some components, they were interpolated by the author on the basis of selected production and trade indicators reported by various international and national sources. In other instances, individual components were estimated on the basis of movements in relevant economic indicators, and in still other instances were determined by residual.


Exchange rate for conversion into United States dollars. Official and market exchange rates as reported by the Statistics Division for the period 1970-2006 were used as the basic set of exchange rates. In general, the Statistics Division used rates reported by the International Monetary Fund, and these series were backdated by the compiler to 1950. For countries with multiple exchange rates, an effective exchange rate was derived from trade data in national currency and United States dollars published in International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund. In several countries in early years a free market rate was used. In a few countries in a few years national exchange rates based on United Nations operational rates were used because foreign trade exchange rates were not available. Because of fluctuations and distortions in estimates of GDP converted to U.S. dollars in some countries, the Statistics Division developed its price-adjusted rates of exchange (PARE), and these have been used.

Reported exchange rates for economies in transition and a few developing countries in a few years have been adjusted to translate gross domestic product levels expressed in domestic prices to levels consistent with estimates and ratios of GDP per capita expressed in U.S. dollars. These rates should be regarded as adjustment coefficients rather than foreign trade exchange rates.

Current price data expressed in U.S. dollars were computed from the current price national currency data by applying a separate exchange rate for each year to the current price national currency data. Constant price data expressed in 1990 U.S. dollars were computed from the constant price national currency data by applying the exchange rate for 1990 to the constant price national currency data for all years.

Aggregation of country data. Estimates for regions of analytical interest have been established by the compiler by aggregation of country data expressed in U.S. dollars. In forming region totals for the national accounts the following modifications were made: National currency data were translated into U.S. dollars on the basis of the exchange rates discussed above; when years covered by data for a country entering a region total did not encompass the entire period desired for the region total, an estimate for the contribution of the country to the region in the missing years was imputed to the region total on the basis of the growth rate for the region during those years excluding that country; and statistical discrepancies were re-computed as the difference between the sum of the separate components of GDP and the estimated total for gross domestic product, or they were allocated on a percentage contribution basis over the components of the grouping table, or a component was derived as a residual. In some countries, the estimate for total GDP was re-computed as the sum of the expenditure components.

Quality of data. A number of reservations must be made about the accuracy and reliability of the data under preparation.

Since the GDP is the most comprehensive estimate of a country's domestic economic activity, achievement of a high degree of accuracy requires a highly developed national statistical organization, a requirement which is beyond the financial and physical resources capacity of many countries. In the case of commodity trade statistics used as supplementary material, although based mainly on more reliable customs declarations made at the frontier, reported data nonetheless suffer from practical difficulties and administrative weaknesses in the statistical collection apparatus of many reporting countries, and in non-reporting countries are often based upon less reliable partner country statistics.

In general, when preparing estimates of economic activity and international trade for many low income countries, consumption, investment, and output originating on the farm, especially in the subsistence sector, tend to be underestimated, and because of sharp disparities in the price and wage structure between the subsistence and market sectors, they probably also tend to be relatively undervalued.

Similar under-estimation and under-valuation occur in the traditional handicraft sector which is rarely integrated fully into the market. Given the magnitude of the farm and handicraft sectors in many low income countries, this under-estimation and under-valuation also affect the GDP total and per capita estimates. In general, the effect of these factors will tend to be greater in countries with low per capita GDP and may be more pronounced in early years than later years, leading to an upward bias in implicit rates of economic growth. In some low-income developing countries the non-monetary component of GDP can exceed 40 per cent.

Conversion of values in current prices to values in constant prices is especially difficult in many developing countries, owing to the paucity of price data, the frequently small scale of the market, and the incidence of high rates of inflation. The revised SNA recommends valuing both exports and imports of goods at the customs frontier at their point of exit, that is, free on board (f.o.b., i.e, exclusive of shipping charges and other costs of transport, insurance and similar charges to their final destination but including costs of distribution to the dock of the exporting country). In fact, many countries value imports of goods at point of entry, that is, including payments made for transport, insurance and similar changes incurred in their onward transportation to the importing country (i.e., c.i.f.). Because of a lack of information, prices used in the estimation of trade volumes are unit values derived from official statistics. In the first instance, price declarations made at the frontier at the time of export or import may differ from actual prices at the time of sale, and are therefore not prices actually obtained in the market. Secondly, basic information from which unit values are derived may be limited to broad categories of products of differing assortments and changing qualities over time, and the average unit values derived from this information are affected by the non-homogeneous nature of the changing mix of items exported and imported. Finally, frequently prices used to compile economic statistics are understated because they do not consider credit conditions surrounding the transactions being measured. For these reasons, unit value indices used in commodity trade statistics and as substitutes for transactions prices when compiling national accounts statistics, especially in the case of exports and imports of manufactured goods and non-standardized production in general, cannot be expected to provide reliable measures of average price changes over time.

In this regard, the problem of quality change in the compilation of economic statistics is a particularly important one. Separate prices for products of different characteristics and qualities should be used to construct an average price index for some given class of goods and services. In practice, however, a limited number of prices are often used to deflate commodity classifications of many different kinds of related products, and frequently changes in commodity composition are not taken into account when constructing the average prices index. When unit values are calculated, the opposite problem may occur when changes in commodity composition in categories which are not strictly homogeneous. In this case, a change in the proportions of different qualities, quantities, grades and sizes of the articles being exported and imported may have taken place, with no adjustment for these changes. In the case of specialized machinery and equipment and other unique products serious distortions of true price relationships can take place. While substitution of price quotations for unit values may be used in the case of some products, it is impossible to adjust the full range of products. Consequently, prices and unit values used to convert values to volumes may contain serious sources of error.

Cross-country comparisons, as well as aggregates and averages for economy groups, suffer further from the failure of the exchange rate -- even in countries with uniform and stable rates -- to reflect with adequate accuracy the relative purchasing power over domestic goods between countries. Studies have shown that in low per capita GDP countries, the exchange rate may understate purchasing power parity by a factor of three. In this respect, likewise, the GDP in countries with lower per capita GDP. The problems entailed in exchange rate conversions are compounded under a regime of managed and variable rates. As a result of large changes in exchange rates, exchange rate conversions for adjacent years sometimes show substantial changes in relative gross domestic products between pairs of countries when no such real change has actually occurred.

Given the changes to which exchange rates may be subject in various countries, cross-country comparisons and region aggregates and averages will also be affected by the particular year selected as the base year for conversion of values in local currencies into values in a common currency.

In summary, although considerable effort has been made to standardize these data both in terms of their temporal comparability and in their conformity with accepted statistical definitions, full comparability is not possible due to weaknesses in the original data and deficiencies inherent in the method used to convert them to a common currency. Estimates for many countries tend to be based on incomplete or unreliable information and are subject to discontinuities and frequent revision, and for this reason should be used with due regard for the approximate nature of much of the underlying basic data as well as the preliminary nature of the estimates for the last two years. No significance should be attached to comparisons involving small statistical differences.

Significance of GDP for measuring material welfare. Though the GDP is intended to measure the market value of all goods and services produced domestically, in fact it measures the value of general government services at cost rather than market price and, except for subsistence farming noted above, it includes the value of household production for the household itself, whether for consumption (e.g., household care and maintenance) or for investment (e.g., in housing) only to the extent that it is provided for payment. On the other hand, it measures the market value of all marketed goods and services, including military expenditure and socially harmful consumption, together with investment for these purposes, as well as expenditures to overcome social disutilities such as increased transportation costs, pollution, or crime, that may be generated by the production process itself or by concomitant social processes such as urbanization. Since household production on own account is larger in countries with lower per capita GDP, while expenditures to overcome social disutilities generated by production or social change is larger in countries with higher per capita GDP, large differences in GDP may be associated with much smaller differences in material welfare.

Among other factors, the composition of output in different countries reflects the small and great differences that consumers place on different kinds of goods and services for reasons of tastes and preferences. The level and composition of output among countries also reflects differences in the distribution of income and other factors bearing upon the state of material welfare. No adjustment has been made for these differences and the effect they many have on inter-temporal and inter-country comparisons.

For all the reasons mentioned above, the GDP can not be used as an index of material welfare, even for measuring the change over time within a country, but especially for measuring differences between countries. It is a reasonably adequate -- although far from perfect -- index only for what it is intended to measure, namely, the output of marketed goods and services, as partially adjusted to include a limited amount of imputed output on the farm and in the household.


Population and Labor Force Data

Population estimates and projections. Population estimates and projections are those prepared by the Population Division of the United Nations under the medium variant assumption as assessed in 2006. Estimates for the years 1950-2005 are those made by the Population Division while projections for the years 2006-2025 correspond to the medium variant projection. In the case of a few countries, estimates from national sources have been substituted for those of the Population Division.

Annual estimates for the total, male and female population and the urban and rural population of individual countries, not shown in the data book but carried in the larger data base of which the estimates of total population have been drawn, are also those of the United Nations Population Division. Interpolations of five-year estimates and projections of the age-structure of the population carried in the larger data base were performed by the compiler for the period 1950-2025 to arrive at estimates (1950-2005) and projections (2006-2025) for individual years.

The medium variant assumption represents an assessment of future demographic trends, expected social and economic progress, ongoing government policies, and prevailing public attitudes towards population questions.

Labor force estimates and projections. Estimates and projections of labor force participation rates for the total labor force correspond to those of the 5th edition of its estimates and projections of the economically active population.

Reported labor force participation rates in the 5th edition provide estimates of labor force participation rates for the total, male and female labor force for the period 1980 to 2000 and projection rates to the year 2020. These rates were applied to the population series to obtain estimates and projections of the total, male, and female labor force.

The labor force estimates for the year 1980 were backdated to 1950 on the basis of trends in the ILO presented in the 4th edition of its estimates and projections of the economially active population.

In making these estimates, the female labor force was derived as the difference between the estimated total labor force and the male labor force.

The labor force comprises the economically active population, including the armed forces and unemployed, but excluding housewives, students and other not economically active groups such as the completely disabled.


Country Coverage

Region and world totals in the Data Book are based on individual country estimates aggregated in accordance with the classifications shown in the annex table:

What is the value of a seat in the Senate?


“Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich was arrested this morning on federal corruption charges. One of the charges was that he tried to sell the Senate seat vacated by President-elect Obama. As governor, Blagojevich is responsible for filling it through appointment.

According to the Chicago Sun-Times, some of the ideas that he floated in exchange for the seat were a substantial salary for himself at a non-profit group or a labor union, a corporate board seat for his wife, campaign contributions, and/or a cabinet post or ambassadorship for himself.

Those are some hefty demands. So you have to wonder how much a Senate seat costs. Well, I did some quick back-of-the-envelope calculations.

First, Senators make a base salary of $167,100. Assuming a person joined the Senate at age 44 and stayed for two terms, and adjusted for 2% inflation with a 2.7% discount rate (10-year treasury), the net present value would be ~$1.9 million.

But membership in the Senate carries more than just a salary. After two terms in the upper chamber, a retiring Senator can become a well-paid lobbyist. Assuming a very conservative base salary (in today's numbers) of $318,362, a Senator-turned-lobbyist could make ~$4.5 million over another 12 years.

But that's not all, Senators are given a lifetime pension starting at age 62. The average annual pension is currently $60,972. If payments started in 18 years and continued until death at 84, the total amount received would be ~$1.8 million.

If you discount everything back to today, the net present value of the Senate seat would be ~$6.2 million.

Not bad for a public sector gig.”

Andrew Roth , “How Much Does a Senate Seat Cost?”, The Club for Growth Blog (9 December 2008).

http://www.clubforgrowth.org/2008/12/how_much_does_a_senate_seat_co.php


Andrew Roth Director of Government Affairs at the Club for Growth, a non-profit political organization whose members help elect candidates to Congress who support the Reagan vision of lower taxes and limited government.

My understanding is that the politicians attempting to buy this seat were not just criminals but also cheap, for they were not willing to pay more than a million dollars for it. Thus, they weren’t willing to pay as a bribe anything near what the seat was really worth.

Or maybe there is another reason. Maybe because, valuable as it is, the $6.2 million a Senate seat is worth must be matched against its opportunity cost, to use an economist’s phrase, that is, against the amount a corrupt politician could earn in his present position. At an implied opportunity cost of over five million dollars, politicians must be well paid in their present posts. That’s a lot more than I thought politicians would be paid. Or, maybe, the pay of a politician is somehow “supplemented” in ways they don’t want us to know about. Just guessing.

07 December 2008

Is the financial crisis the fault of finance professors?


“Fifteen years ago, I argued that banks’ increasing involvement in securities activities worldwide could eventually lead to a repetition of the 1929/33 banking meltdown. My analysis rested on the observation that if banks were permitted to diversify away from non-core banking activities the moral hazard that is known to promote excessive risk-taking in traditional banking would be extended to these other activities, in particular securities markets. The question then was whether ‘the mixing of banking and securities business can be regulated in such a way as to avoid the danger of a catastrophic destabilisation of financial markets’. After considering all the regulatory options, I concluded that there was no solution: “Allowing banks to engage in risky non-bank activities could either destabilise the financial system by triggering a wave of contagious bank failures – or alternatively impose potentially enormous costs on tax payers by obliging governments or their agencies to undertake open-ended support operations.”

The prevailing view amongst finance academics at the time … was that financial structure was largely irrelevant to the question of systemic stability. According to the conventional wisdom we had learned from the 1929/33 crash, a monetary contraction such as occurred then could be neutralised by injecting reserves into the banking system and a flight to quality, because it merely redistributes bank reserves, “is unlikely to be a source of systemic risk”. This widely held view of the behaviour of financial markets turns out to have been entirely misguided. As we have witnessed in recent months, a major shock arising from publicised losses on banks’ securities holdings can have a domino effect on financial institutions, leading ultimately to a seizure in credit markets which central bankers, on their own, are powerless to unblock. Only drastic government intervention – guarantees for money market funds, guarantees for interbank lending, emergency deposit insurance cover, lending directly to the commercial paper market, and partly nationalising the banking industry – has prevented a full repetition of the 1929/33 financial meltdown.

What we have witnessed in recent months is not only the fracturing of the world’s financial system but the discrediting of an academic discipline. There are some 4000 university finance professors worldwide, thousands of finance research papers are published each year, and yet there have been few if any warnings from the academic community of the incendiary potential of global financial markets. Is it too harsh to conclude that despite the considerable academic resources that go into finance research our understanding of the behaviour of financial markets is no greater than it was in 1929/33 or indeed 1720?”
Richard Dale, “The financial meltdown is an academic crisis, too”, Vox: Research-based policy analysis and commentary from leading economists (27 November 2008).

http://voxeu.com/index.php?q=node/2618


Richard Dale is Emeritus Professor of International Banking, Southampton University, United Kingdom.

There is supposed to be a difference between practitioners of finance and professors of finance. Practitioners of finance are for the most part cheerleaders for innovation, entrepreneurship and the importance of saving and credit in the building of a prosperous economy. One expects them to exaggerate the possibilities of a successful investment and to be bullish about the prospects for the future, if only their advice were to be followed. They are almost always dressed impeccably in tailor-made suits, of good cheer, polished manner, energetic in their demeanor, and often of mischievous wit. Wonderful people, those who know them well love them but nonetheless always discount what they say about the market and their investment suggestions by half.

Professors of finance, on the other hand, live in a troubled world of risk and uncertainty. They are usually full of anxieties and anxious about the future, filled with an uneasiness that comes from the fear that they might say something that lead someone to do something that would cause the hearer to lose a fortune in the market on their bad advice. They speak more of financial institutions, regulatory reform and mathematical equations than of good investments, bond returns and dividend performance. Slovenly dressed in cheap suits, silent and lost in thought in the classroom, pessimistic of mind and lacking the grace of their soon to be well-paid students, they are slow and unexciting scholars of an urgent discipline that rewards the quick and imaginative. Beloved by all, especially their students, their every word is at once treasured and forgotten, treasured when its serene wisdom is helpful in the pursuit of market gain and forgotten when its nervous insight warns of the risks inherent in all investment strategies.

The events that that have unfolded this past year have been difficult for the practitioner of finance. He has gambled with the fickle future of financial success and he has lost, at least for the moment. The loss is deep and unsettling. But his spirit is not dejected because he also knows, however bad the immediate portents, the economy will recover and when it does his advice will be welcome again. Setbacks are, after all, mere setbacks, events to be overcome and providing challenges to be met once the economy inevitably recovers. So what if people believe only half of what the financial advisor says: At least he can say they believe, and more importantly that they trust and act on the advice he gives, which is more than can be said for most professions.

For the professor of finance (and of economics) the events of this past year have been devastating. It is not simply that no one foresaw the scale and scope and complexity of the disaster that has descended upon us. That would be bad enough. But by his teaching and his research he set the stage for the disaster. Unlike the market professional, the detached and objective financial scholar or economist is expected to identify and warn about the growing bubbles that have been wreaking havoc in financial markets, and he failed to do so. Unlike the financial executive dependent on his advice, the academic carries the burden of ensuring that the financial innovations and techniques he introduces to the firm are safe to use and reduce market volatility and the danger of financial collapse, and again he failed to do so. Unlike the government bureaucrat seeking counsel on regulatory matters, he is supposed to recommend changes that strengthen the financial system, not weaken it, and once again he failed to do so.

But it is even worse than this. None of the ideas offered by professors of economics and finance to rein in the crisis have worked. At each and every step on the rocky road to the present disaster their advice has failed to stem the decline. A year ago financial problems developed and the Fed was unable to prevent problems in one area, housing, from spreading throughout the entire financial system. Soon, production and employment across the real economy began to decline and decline steeply. The effects of the faulting U.S. economy were then transmitted to other countries, and the global economy began to weaken and may well be in freefall. At each step not only were the measures put in place inadequate and their implementation confused, they proved to be completely ineffective in reversing the downturn. This points to an intellectual failure to understand how a modern economy works and what can be done to manage its performance, the very responsibility of the academic, and yet another area of failure.

In short, unlike practitioners of finance and government officials, professors of finance (and economics) are expected to provide the ideas policymakers need to explain what is happening in the financial sector and the economy and to guide policy toward financial stability and the effective management of prosperity. Instead, they have made things worse than they might have been and still cannot seem to provide the intellectual leadership necessary to overcome the crisis. To that extent the financial crisis must be said to be their fault.

04 December 2008

Origins of the financial crisis


“The financial crisis that has been wreaking havoc in
markets in the U.S. and across the world since August
2007 had its origins in an asset price bubble that
interacted with new kinds of financial innovations that
masked risk; with companies that failed to follow their
own risk management procedures; and with regulators and
supervisors that failed to restrain excessive taking. ....

Over the past decade, private sector commercial and
investment banks developed new ways of securitizing
subprime mortgages: by packaging them into
"Collateralized Debt Obligations" (sometimes with other
asset-backed securities), and then dividing the cash
flows into different "tranches" to appeal to different
classes of investors with different tolerances for risk.
By ordering the rights to the cash flows, the developers
of CDOs ... were able to convince the credit rating
agencies to assign their highest ratings to the
securities in the highest tranche, or risk class. ....

These new innovations ... facilitated the boom in
subprime lending that occurred after 2000. ...
[H]ouseholds previously unable to qualify for mortgage
credit became eligible for loans. This new group of
eligible borrowers increased housing demand and helped
inflate home prices.

These new financial innovations thrived in an environment
of easy monetary policy by the Federal Reserve and poor
regulatory oversight. .... [P]anic hit in 2007, however,
as sudden uncertainty over asset prices caused lenders to
abruptly refuse to rollover their debts, and over-
leveraged banks found themselves exposed to falling asset
prices with very little capital.

While ex post we can certainly say that the system-wide
increase in borrowed money was irresponsible and bound
for catastrophe, it is not shocking that consumers,
would-be homeowners, and profit-maximizing banks will
borrow more money when asset prices are rising; indeed,
it is quite intuitive. What is especially shocking,
though, is how institutions along each link of the
securitization chain failed so grossly to perform
adequate risk assessment on the mortgage-related assets
they held and traded. ... [A]t no point did any
institution stop the party or question the little-
understood computer risk models, or the blatantly
unsustainable deterioration of the loan terms of the
underlying mortgages.”
Martin Neil Baily, Robert E. Litan, and Matthew S.
Johnson, The Origins of the Financial Crisis (Brookings
Institution, Initiative on Business and Public Policy,
Washington, DC, November 2008).

http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2008/11_orgins_crisis_baily_litan.aspx

Martin Neil Baily, Robert E. Litan, and Matthew S. Johnson are all with the Brookings Institution.

The authors find that the financial crisis has its origins in a housing price bubble where too many people thought that housing prices could only go up, this led to an increased demand for housing, which in turn spurred new kinds of financial innovations that masked the risk inherent in these loans, and that all involved in marketing, packaging and managing these mortgages failed to prudently originate and process the mortgages. They also recommend reforms of financial institutions, government regulators, and credit rating agencies.

Thanks to Larry Willmore for the Tdj. Larry says this is a superb 47 page analysis of the financial mess, and wishes to thank Michael Littlewood for bringing it to his attention.

01 December 2008

Krugman on what to do about the global economic crisis


“What the world needs right now is a rescue operation. The global credit system is in a state of paralysis, and a global slump is building momentum as I write this. Reform of the weaknesses that made this crisis possible is essential, but it can wait a little while. First, we need to deal with the clear and present danger. To do this, policymakers around the world need to do two things: get credit flowing again and prop up spending.

The first task is the harder of the two, but it must be done, and soon. Hardly a day goes by without news of some further disaster wreaked by the freezing up of credit. ...

Even if the rescue of the financial system starts to bring credit markets back to life, we'll still face a global slump that's gathering momentum. What should be done about that? The answer, almost surely, is good old Keynesian fiscal stimulus. ...

I believe not only that we're living in a new era of depression economics, but also that John Maynard Keynes—the economist who made sense of the Great Depression—is now more relevant than ever. Keynes concluded his masterwork, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, with a famous disquisition on the importance of economic ideas: "Soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil."

We can argue about whether that's always true, but in times like these, it definitely is. The quintessential economic sentence is supposed to be "There is no free lunch"; it says that there are limited resources, that to have more of one thing you must accept less of another, that there is no gain without pain. Depression economics, however, is the study of situations where there is a free lunch, if we can only figure out how to get our hands on it, because there are unemployed resources that could be put to work. The true scarcity in Keynes's world—and ours—was therefore not of resources, or even of virtue, but of understanding.

We will not achieve the understanding we need, however, unless we are willing to think clearly about our problems and to follow those thoughts wherever they lead. Some people say that our economic problems are structural, with no quick cure available; but I believe that the only important structural obstacles to world prosperity are the obsolete doctrines that clutter the minds of men.”

Paul Krugman, “What to do”, The New York Review of Books (Yet to be formally published, 18 December 2008).


Paul Krugman (1953-) is a professor of economics and international affairs at Princeton University, and a columnist for The New York Times. Earlier this year he won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences "for his analysis of trade patterns and location of economic activity".

Paul Krugman is at once one of the best and one of the most controversial economists commenting on economic affairs today. There is no doubt that his academic accomplishments in the areas of trade theory, economic geography, and international finance are worthy of a Nobel Prize. And there is no doubt that he is more than outspoken in his opposition to ideas he does not like, often in a "shrill" rhetorical style, wins him few friends among the many he attacks. In this regard, he has been among the harshest critics of the Bush Administration.

As is reflected in this except, Krugman is a strong Keynesian and calls, in typical Keynesian fashion, for government measures to boost aggregate demand. He would no doubt approve of a coordinated fiscal stimulus from many countries to boost the global economy. In yesterday’s Tdj, I expressed reservations about this approach. I add here that increased spending takes time to approve, more time to implement (especially, when the new spending takes the form of public works projects, such as those now being advocated), and even more time yet to have an impact on the economy. Fiscal policy is not a short-term measure.

The world economy is now sinking and sinking rapidly. World manufacturing production is tumbling, with reports much weaker than expected. New car sales are down across the world. Exports are shrinking. Consumer and business confidence is falling everywhere. Exchange rates are increasingly volatile. And of course the financial crisis, which is world-wide in scope, continues unabated. No one knows when the bottom will be reached and a recovery might begin. Some people think it will be some time.

From the discussions now taking place at the national and international level, governments and international agencies think the downturn will be steep and prolonged. It would appear the strategy now being formulated for dealing with a global recession consists of measures and actions to be taken over three time horizons: In the short-term, immediate attention focuses on restoring confidence in the financial system by recapitalizing financial institutions and attempting to overcome the problems created by a liquidity trap, nationally by guaranteeing loans and mortgages and internationally by bilateral currency swaps to ensure foreign currency liquidity; Over the medium-term, measures to sustain demand, such as a very loose monetary policy and a fiscal policy that includes cutting taxes and increasing spending, are being advocated; Looking to the longer-term, attention will be directed at reforming the regulatory and supervisory frameworks of financial markets to reduce systemic risks, improve financial intermediation and allow for better coordination among countries.

In my view, Krugman will get his wish. There will be a lot of government spending in our future and the future of other countries. But it will take time to put spending measures into effect and one has to wonder if in the end they will be any more effective than the efforts to get credit flowing again have been. My suspicion is all the spending will not help; indeed, I think it might even further unbalance the economy. In my view, we would be better off just stabilizing the policy environment by setting sensible rules for taxes, business activity and government spending and telling the public the rules are not going to change for the foreseeable future.

30 November 2008

Did the Republicans name Obama’s economic team?


“What would you call a group of economists who are skeptical of regulating mortgage markets, who think unemployment insurance and unions increase unemployment, who say that tax hikes retard economic growth, and who believe that the recovery from the Great Depression was a monetary phenomenon rather than the result of New Deal fiscal policy?

No, it is not a right-wing cabal. It's Team Obama.

Here's the evidence:

When Senator Christopher J. Dodd, Democrat of Connecticut, gave his opening statement last week at the hearings lambasting the rise of “risky exotic and subprime mortgages,” he was actually tapping into a very old vein of suspicion against innovations in the mortgage market.....Congress is contemplating a serious tightening of regulations to make the new forms of lending more difficult. New research from some of the leading housing economists in the country, however, examines the long history of mortgage market innovations and suggests that regulators should be mindful of the potential downside in tightening too much.

--Austan Goolsbee

Unemployment insurance also extends the time a person stays off the job. Clark and I estimated that the existence of unemployment insurance almost doubles the number of unemployment spells lasting more than three months. If unemployment insurance were eliminated, the unemployment rate would drop by more than half a percentage point, which means that the number of unemployed people would fall by about 750,000. This is all the more significant in light of the fact that less than half of the unemployed receive insurance benefits, largely because many have not worked enough to qualify.

Another cause of long-term unemployment is unionization. High union wages that exceed the competitive market rate are likely to cause job losses in the unionized sector of the economy. Also, those who lose high-wage union jobs are often reluctant to accept alternative low-wage employment. Between 1970 and 1985, for example, a state with a 20 percent unionization rate, approximately the average for the fifty states and the District of Columbia, experienced an unemployment rate that was 1.2 percentage points higher than that of a hypothetical state that had no unions.

--Larry Summers

Tax changes have very large effects on output. Our baseline specification suggests that an exogenous tax increase of one percent of GDP lowers real GDP by roughly three percent.

--Christina Romer (writing with husband David)

Given the key roles of monetary contraction and the gold standard in causing the Great Depression, it is not surprising that currency devaluations and monetary expansion became the leading sources of recovery throughout the world....the new spending programs initiated by the New Deal had little direct expansionary effect on the economy.

--Christina Romer

All points well taken. Indeed, quotations like these make me pleased with recent economic appointments. I just hope that the above lessons make their way into the President-elect's briefing memos and that he is persuaded by them.

These quotations also make me a bit surprised we have not heard more complaining from the left-wing of the Democratic party. But that may be still to come.”

Greg Mankiw, “The Next Team”, Greg Mankiw’s Blog (30 November 2008).

http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/

N. Gregory "Greg" Mankiw (1958-) is a professor of economics at Harvard University. From 2003 to 2005, he was the chairman of President Bush's Council of Economic Advisors. Professor Mankiw is among the most influential economists in the world. His text on economics is used in classes at Regent University.

Let me add that others on the Obama Team, such as Timothy Geithner, Jason Furman and Peter Orszag, are not as centrist as the three mentioned above, and they have been placed in the “operational” positions of the Obama Administration rather than the “thinking” positions of Summers and Romer. Austan Goolsbee, Obama’s economic advisor during the campaign, was also on the left side of the intellectual spectrum. Obama’s Team, taken as a whole, is a mixed bag, and frankly more dangerous for the fact that the advice of the centrists is like to be ignored in the actual implementation of policy.

As mentioned before, we are in an unprecedented situation. I don’t think anyone has a good grasp of the problem before us or what to do about it. I am sure the incoming administration will do something -- they have to do something -- but one would hope that they would be willing to be flexible and willing to change policy directions if the measures they take do not work. Right now, the guess is they will try to prop up spending by a massive Keynesian spending program. I for one am doubtful that a fiscal stimulus will work in the present circumstances as the real economy is not yet in such distress that it could benefit from an injection of additional aggregate demand.

To me, the problem is people now have tremendous liquidity preference, that is, they want to hold money rather than bonds or equities. They do not want invest and they do not want to spend. They want to hoard. Pumping more money into the economy or increasing government spending is not going to help. People don’t have confidence in the economy or the policy makers.

What will help is for people to regain confidence that the financial system is sound. The must feel that the investments they make will not melt away because of irrational rules imposed by the government or insane bets made by money managers, that the job they have will not disappear because the exchange rate or taxes drove their firm out of business, that the tax rates they have to pay will not constantly change on a politician’s whim, that the taxes and regulations they must pay and conform to when operating their businesses will not suddenly change and destroy their livelihood, and that the trade and budget deficits be addressed so the exchange rate doesn’t collapse and interest rates don’t skyrocket. In a word, people want the economy and government policy to be stable so they can plan their own futures with confidence.

First and foremost, this means stable economic policies that create a stable macroeconomic environment. No more of this today we’re going to increase your taxes but tomorrow we’re going to lower your taxes. No more of this today we’re going to expand energy production in the U.S. but tomorrow we’re not going to do a thing about energy. No more of this today we’re concerned about the twin deficits but tomorrow we’re going to spend like there’s no tomorrow. No more great swings in interest rates and no more great bailouts.

Let us hope that the new economic team will emphasize simple prudence and stability in economic policy. Then the financial system and the economy will recover by itself.

25 November 2008

Did the Stimulus Act of 2008 work?


“The incoming Obama administration and congressional Democrats are now considering a second fiscal stimulus package, estimated at more than $500 billion, to follow the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008. As they do, much can be learned by examining the first.

The major part of the first stimulus package was the $115 billion, temporary rebate payment program targeted to individuals and families that phased out as incomes rose. Most of the rebate checks were mailed or directly deposited during May, June and July.


The argument in favor of these temporary rebate payments was that they would increase consumption, stimulate aggregate demand, and thereby get the economy growing again. What were the results? The chart nearby reveals the answer.

The upper line shows disposable personal income through September. Disposable personal income is what households have left after paying taxes and receiving transfers from the government. The big blip is due to the rebate payments in May through July.

The lower line shows personal consumption expenditures by households. Observe that consumption shows no noticeable increase at the time of the rebate. Hence, by this simple measure, the rebate did little or nothing to stimulate consumption, overall aggregate demand, or the economy.

These results may seem surprising, but they are not. They correspond very closely to what basic economic theory tells us. According to the permanent-income theory of Milton Friedman, or the life-cycle theory of Franco Modigliani, temporary increases in income will not lead to significant increases in consumption. However, if increases are longer-term, as in the case of permanent tax cut, then consumption is increased, and by a significant amount.

After years of study and debate, theories based on the permanent-income model led many economists to conclude that discretionary fiscal policy actions, such as temporary rebates, are not a good policy tool. Rather, fiscal policy should focus on the "automatic stabilizers" (the tendency for tax revenues to decline in a recession and transfer payments such as unemployment compensation to increase in a recession), which are built into the tax-and-transfer system, and on more permanent fiscal changes that will positively affect the long-term growth of the economy.”

John B. Taylor, “Why Permanent Tax Cuts Are the Best Stimulus”, The Wall Street Journal (25 November 2008).

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122757149157954723.html

John B. Taylor is professor of economics at Stanford University. He was a member of the President's Council of Economic Advisers during the Ford and George H. W. Bush administrations.

Following a Keynesian prescription to stimulate aggregate demand in a downturn, the first and possibly a second fiscal stimulus package now under discussion are intended to temporarily compensate for the drop in consumer spending caused by the credit crisis of 2008. In this view, the cash received by households would be spent on consumer goods at retail merchants, which would in turn revive wholesalers, shippers and eventually suppliers of the goods and services purchased.

However, consumers may not act in the way assumed by Keynesian economics. The permanent-income hypothesis of Milton Friedman and the Life-Cycle theory of Franco Modigliani suggest that consumers consider their entire future, not just their position at the moment. If they think their future income might be lower than they previously thought, they will lower their current spending, even if their income might temporarily rise. The uncertainty of the present situation and the possibility that the current crisis could portend a significant change in the economy’s long-term performance could well change peoples’ assessment of their future income. Moreover, the stock market decline and the general view that capital assets may well have suffered a permanent deflation could cause a lasting negative “wealth effect”, where the fall in their wealth could lead them to “tighten their belt” and spend less than in the past. Indeed, any temporary injection of income may well be saved as people attempt to rebuilt their wealth position and replenish their saving.

After pointing out the limited response to the first stimulus package and the uncertain impact that any new package of temporary measures might have, Professor Taylor goes on to suggest some bipartisan measures that are, in his words, permanent, pervasive, and predicable:

First, make a commitment, passed into law, to keep all income-tax rates were they are now, effectively making current tax rates permanent. This would be a significant stimulus to the economy...

Second, enact a worker's tax credit equal to 6.2% of wages up to $8,000 as Mr. Obama proposed during the campaign -- but make it permanent rather than a one-time check.

Third, recognize explicitly that the "automatic stabilizers" are likely to be as large as 2.5% of GDP this fiscal year, that they will help stabilize the economy, and that they should be viewed as part of the overall fiscal package even if they do not require legislation.

Fourth, construct a government spending plan that meets long-term objectives, puts the economy on a path to budget balance, and is expedited to the degree possible without causing waste and inefficiency.

In his view, these proposals would be more helpful to the economy than the ideas and policies now being discussed and implemented.]

24 November 2008

Brad DeLong’s question: Huh? Where did the money go?


“Brad DeLong asks a question which seems obvious enough to me – but seems to elude him.


“Why oh why can't we have a better press corps? Eric Dash and Julie Creswell write that:

• Citigroup had poor risk controls.
• As a result, the bank owned $43 billion of mortgage-related assets that it incorrectly thought were safe.
• They weren't.
• And so as a result the market value of Citi has collapsed by a factor of ten: from $200 billion to $20 billion.

To which the only appropriate response is: "Huh?" How can losses out of $43 billion of optimistically overvalued assets eliminate $224 billion of value? Eric Dash and Julie Creswell don't answer that question. They don't even seem to recognize that it is a question that they should be interested in. That they were given this story to write, and that no editors said "wait a minute! this doesn't add up!" is yet another signal that The New York Times is in its death spiral: not the place to go to learn anything about an issue.”

I think he is a little rough to criticise the NYT for that – or for that matter any other paper – because at the moment the Treasury and the FDIC are also acting (at least until now) as if they do not know the answer.

The answer is that the crisis is not about the amount of losses yet realised or yet to be realised, and it is not about capital adequacy of the banks and it is not about their level of leverage. It is simply about the question “do we trust them to repay their debts”. You might think is about capital or losses or leverage – but even if the bank has adequate capital and losses come are relatively small if we believe collectively that they can’t repay then they can’t repay. Sure more capital would produce more trust – but the level of distrust at the moment is so high that nobody can tell you how much capital is needed. All estimates are a shot in the dark. In reality all that is needed is more trust.

The short answer to the Brad deLong question is that due to the losses and the lack of risk control people stopped believing in Citigroup – and hence Citigroup dies without a bailout. It was however pretty easy to stop believing in Citigroup because nobody (at least nobody normal) can understand their accounts. I can not understand them and I am a pretty sophisticated bank analyst. I know people I think are better than me – and they can’t understand Citigroup either. So Citigroup was always a “trust us” thing and now we do not trust. “
John Hempton, “The Brad DeLong question - and how to design a bailout that works”, Bronte Capital Blog (25 November 2008).

http://brontecapital.blogspot.com/2008/11/brad-delong-question-and-how-to-design_24.html


John Hempton is a (semi) retired fund manager based in Sydney Australia. Brad DeLong, who Hempton quotes, is professor of economics at the University of California, Berkeley.

It’s a good question. It is said that only a relatively small percentage of U.S. homeowners, probably no more than 5 per cent of the total, had a serious problem paying their mortgage. Yet once the housing problem became generally known the price of housing did not just fall, it collapsed, and when it collapsed Wall Street and many financial institutions were brought down in a cascading tumbling of one bank and insurance company after another. How is this possible? Equally, how is it possible that Citigroup, the world’s largest financial services network and owner of a major international bank such as Citibank, can go under when only a small portion of its assets become questionable?

The answer is that Citibank, like all banks, borrows short and invests long. It has a lot of deposits -- short-term liabilities -- and it has a lot of investments -- long-term assets on which it expects to earn future income to cover its costs and generate a profit. Citibank has taken the money of a lot of people and promised them they can have it back any time they want it. The problem is Citibank doesn’t have their money, at least not in a form it can use to pay them back immediately, for it has lent that money out to borrowers or purchased securities with the cash of its depositors. In normal times, its assets far exceed its liabilities, as the prices of its assets remain stable and the number of depositors asking for their money back is small. In crisis times, however, its assets become sharply devalued and it quickly becomes insolvent.

When a crisis develops questions are raised about a bank’s ability to meet its commitments, and its troubles multiply quickly. Its assets are in the future while its liabilities are due today. To meet its obligations it must immediately sell its investments to generate needed cash. But future assets are worth less than current assets, for they are uncertain, and the more the assets a bank like Citibank holds are in the future, the lower and more uncertain their present value. Worse, if questions arise about the quality of the assets they are quickly and substantially discounted, for risky assets are worth much less than safe assets. Even worse yet, if the depositors, other financial institutions and the public in general do not trust the institution, it must dump its assets, probably to no avail, because it will in all likelihood become insolvent.

One of the purposes of the Fed is to act as “lender of last resort” to banks facing a run and needing liquidity. But the magnitude of the current crisis has overwhelmed the Fed. Moreover, the fall in asset prices is so steep, their value so uncertain, and the trust among the institutions and with the public so destroyed, that normal policies and regular mechanisms are completely ineffective in restoring financial stability.

In short, the money depositors originally put into the banks disappeared because the value of the assets the banks purchased disappeared and the value of the assets disappeared because they had to be sold at a deep discount and they had to be sold at a deep discount because people stopped trusting Citibank and the other banks. Deposit insurance and injections of funds from the Treasury and the Fed will make almost all depositors whole by shifting the losses to the general public. But until some semblance of trust within the financial community, and between the financial community and the public, is regained, there will be no end to the ongoing financial crisis.

23 November 2008

The Great Depression, the New Deal and our present problems


“Many people are looking back to the Great Depression and the New Deal for answers to our problems. But while we can learn important lessons from this period, they’re not always the ones taught in school. ... I would start with the following lessons:

Monetary Policy is Key: As Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz argued in a classic book,... the single biggest cause of the Great Depression was that the Federal Reserve let the money supply fall by one-third, causing deflation. Furthermore, banks were allowed to fail, causing a credit crisis. Roosevelt’s best policies were those designed to increase the money supply, get the banking system back on its feet and restore trust in financial institutions. ...

Today, expansionary monetary policy isn’t so easy to put into effect, as we are seeing a shrinkage of credit and a contraction of the “shadow banking sector,”... So don’t expect the benefits of monetary expansion to kick in right now, or even six months from now.

Still, the Fed needs to stand ready to prevent a downward spiral and to stimulate the economy once it’s possible.

Get the Small Things Right: ...Roosevelt instituted a disastrous legacy of agricultural subsidies and sought to cartelize industry... Neither policy helped the economy recover.

He also took steps to strengthen unions and to keep real wages high. This helped workers who had jobs, but made it much harder for the unemployed to get back to work. One result was unemployment rates that remained high throughout the New Deal period.

Today, President-elect Barack Obama faces pressures to make unionization easier, but such policies are likely to worsen the recession for many Americans.

Don't Raise Taxes in a Slump: The New Deal’s legacy of public works programs has given many people the impression that it was a time of expansionary fiscal policy, but that isn’t quite right. Government spending went up considerably, but taxes rose, too. ... When all of these tax increases are taken into account, New Deal fiscal policy didn’t do much to promote recovery.

War Isn't the Weapon: World War II did help the American economy, but the gains came in the early stages, when America was still just selling war-related goods to Europe and was not yet a combatant. ...

While overall economic output was rising, and the military draft lowered unemployment, the war years were generally not prosperous ones. As for today, we shouldn’t think that fighting a war is the way to restore economic health.

You Can't Turn Bad Into Good: The good New Deal policies, like constructing a basic social safety net, made sense on their own terms and would have been desirable in the boom years of the 1920s as well. The bad policies made things worse. Today, that means we should restrict extraordinary measures to the financial sector as much as possible and resist the temptation to “do something” for its own sake. ...

Our current downturn will end as well someday, and, as in the ’30s, the recovery will probably come for reasons that have little to do with most policy initiatives.”


Tyler Cowen, “The New Deal Didn’t Always Work, Either”, The New York Times (21 November 2008).

http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/23/business/23view.html


Tyler Cowen is a professor of economics at George Mason University.

In this Op Ed, Professor Cowen points out that in the view of many economists the Great Depression was caused mainly by a monetary collapse that can be traced to the failure of the Federal Reserve to properly manage the money supply. During the time from August 1929 to the cyclical trough of the depression in March 1933 the money supply fell by a third, and in their view it is this contraction in the stock of money that brought about the collapse of the banking system and accelerated the decline in production and employment. In some sense, the economic and financial catastrophe of the 1930s is seen as a failure of leadership on the part of the Fed, as drift and indecision on the part of members of its governing board paralyzed policy making and needed action to stem the contraction of the economy.

Cowen also points out that the root of today’s crisis is not in a monetary contraction and deflation. In this regard, the Fed has done everything it can (some would say too much) to prop up banks and other financial institutions. In doing so, one of its problems is that a huge shadow banking system has developed where credit derivative instruments not under the control of the Fed are traded. Since monetary policy does not directly affect shadow institutions, the effect of the Fed’s actions are weakened and therefore it will take monetary policy longer to stimulate the economy. Nevertheless, it is fair to say the Fed is doing all it can to implement an expansionary monetary policy and save the banks. If the deteriorating economy is to be turned around, it will have to come from other measures.

This leaves fiscal policy and ad hoc measures. However, some of the proposals under discussion are similar to those made as part of the New Deal, and many of those ideas clearly made a bad situation worse. Any attempt by the government to prop up housing prices, for example, would leave in its wake a tremendous inventory of unsold houses with the potential for another housing crisis down the road. Efforts to make it easier to unionize the work force without the clear agreement of the workforce, as proposed in the “Employee Freedom of Choice Act”, would drive up wages and potentially raise the long-term unemployment rate. As another example, an auto industry bailout that protected the industry from foreign competition and tightened the insane Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards while it failed to address the need to invigorate management with a sense of purpose and the unions with a sense of reality would be disastrous for the entire manufacturing sector. Finally, raising taxes or, just as bad, flirting with protectionism, would set the stage for a prolonged and deep recession.

The U.S. economy is in deep trouble. Two months have passed since Treasury Secretary Paulson announced the financial system was on the verge of collapse. It still has not been stabilized, as reflected in by a very week interbank market and the continuing fall in equity prices, particularly those of banks. It would appear that government regulators are considering a plan to bail out Citigroup and the spreads for the credit default swaps of major banks are rising, indicating that the financial markets believe other banks have the potential to default on their obligations. Add to this the mad scramble by every firm, every state and every city for a bailout and a picture of utter financial chaos emerges.

One can only pray that the President-Elect and his economic team provide the intellectual and policy leadership during a crisis that the Federal Reserve and the Executive Branch failed to show during the Great Depression.

18 November 2008

Have the incomes of middle income Americans really stagnated?


“According to the U.S. Census Bureau, median household income adjusted for inflation increased a scant 18 percent over the past 30 years. In contrast, data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) indicate that income per person was up 80 percent, almost doubling. A widely reported explanation for these statistics is that the rich reaped most of the benefits of economic growth over this period, while middle-income households gained little. Findings on rising inequality are consistent with this view.

These statistics appear quite compelling, but hiding in the background are some key issues that might alter the story. Average household size declined substantially
during the past 30 years, so household income is being spread across fewer people. The mix of household types—married versus single, young versus old—also changed considerably, so the “median household” in 2006 looks quite different from the “median household” in 1976. Finally, the measure of income used by the Census Bureau to compute household income excludes some rapidly growing sources of income.

The claim that the standard of living of middle Americans has stagnated over the past generation is common. An accompanying assertion is that virtually all income growth over the past three decades bypassed middle America and accrued almost entirely to the rich.

The findings reported here … refute those claims. Careful analysis shows that the incomes of most types of middle American households have increased substantially over the past three decades. These results are consistent with recent research showing that the largest income increases occurred at the top end of the income distribution. But the outsized gains of the rich do not mean that middle America stagnated.”

Terry J. Fitzgerald, “Where Has All the Income Gone?”, The Region: A Publication of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (September 2008).

http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/region/08-09/income.pdf


Terry J. Fitzgerald is a Senior Economist with the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.

One frequently hears that the modern American economy distributes income inequitably and that income growth over the past few decades has been confined almost entirely to the rich.

But before accepting these statements one should be aware that the measurement of income distribution and the benefit of economic growth to different groups in the economy is fraught with difficulties and misconceptions, and people sometimes chose data that simply fit their preconceptions.

A host of factors can affect the measurement of the growth and distribution of real income among the population. These include the changing size of households mentioned above, the choice the price index used to deflate income, changes in the types of households (whether a household consists of Married couples or singles, or whether children are present or not), changes in the age structure of households, whether income is measured pre- or post-tax, whether one looks at changes to the incomes of a standard sample of income recipients or allow the introduction of new households, among many other factors. One should also be aware that income distribution patterns also vary of the business cycle, becoming more even during upturns and more uneven during downturns when unemployment rises.

When assessing the rise in income over the longer-term, it is useful to keep in mind that patterns of income change only slowly whereas increases in real incomes can rise markedly. For this reason, when measured comprehensively and adjusted for changes in demographic attributes, the benefits of economic growth tend to be distributed rather evenly across the entire population. At times the rich may benefit more from growth than lower income groups, but the incomes of low and middle income groups have not stagnated in the U.S. and they certainly have not fallen, as many reports in the popular press allege.

Thanks for Greg Mankiw’s blog for the pointer.

16 November 2008

Auto worker compensation: Detroit vs. the Japanese transplants




“Why is GM (and Ford and Chrysler) seeking taxpayer subsidies when Toyota, Honda, Nissan, Kia, BMW, Daimler, Hyundai and other foreign nameplate producers, who are facing the same contracting demand and credit crunch quietly weathering the storm, are not? Because the latter have costs structures that haven’t been made obsolete and uneconomic by ludicrous union demands (see chart above, …). And, of course, they make cars that Americans want to buy.”

“A Cancer on the Big Three: The $29/Hr. Pay Gap”, Carpe Diem: Professor Mark J. Perry's Blog for Economics and Finance (14 November 2008).

http://mjperry.blogspot.com/2008/11/cancer-on-big-three-29hr-pay-gap.html


Dr. Perry is Professor of Finance and Business Economics at the University of Michigan-Flint.

The differences in costs between the Big 3 automakers of Detroit and the foreign transplants that also build autos in the United States is reflected in the $25-$30 difference in hourly pay. Given this difference, if the government bails out the Big 3, one might very well ask why an autoworker in the South should pay taxes to support his better paid Northern counterpart, when they work just as hard in the South as they do in the North. Indeed, one might ask why should any American should subsidize well paid autoworkers (or for that matter, extremely overpaid CEOs on Wall Street).

More generally, overpaid autoworkers are only one part of the difficulty before the American auto industry. Just as important, perhaps more important, is weak management and its years of failing to restructure an industry in desperate need of restructuring. In a recent article in the Wall Street Journal, David Yermack, a professor of finance at New York University's Stern School of Business, explained recently in the Wall Street Journal (15 November 2008) part of the problem before the country as it tries to decide what to do about GM and the other auto dinosaurs:

“Over the past decade, the capital destruction by GM has been breathtaking… GM has invested $310 billion in its business between 1998 and 2007. The total depreciation of GM's physical plant during this period was $128 billion, meaning that a net $182 billion of society's capital has been pumped into GM over the past decade -- a waste of about $1.5 billion per month of national savings. The story at Ford has not been as adverse but is still disheartening, as Ford has invested $155 billion and consumed $8 billion net of depreciation since 1998.

As a society, we have very little to show for this $465 billion. At the end of 1998, GM's market capitalization was $46 billion and Ford's was $71 billion. Today both firms have negligible value, with share prices in the low single digits. Both are facing imminent bankruptcy and delisting from the major stock exchanges. Along with management, the companies' unions and even their regulators in Washington may have their own culpability, a topic that merits its own separate discussion. Yet one can only imagine how the $465 billion could have been used better -- for instance, GM and Ford could have closed their own facilities and acquired all of the shares of Honda, Toyota, Nissan and Volkswagen.”

As the country considers what to do about GM and the other dinosaurs of the auto industry, it should keep in mind that one of the wonderful things about free market capitalism is that poorly run businesses are driven out of business, and their incompetent managers are, as Ludwig von Mises put it, “relegated to a place [unemployment] in which [their] ineptitude no longer hurts people’s well being”. Only intervention by government can save management so that it continues to inflict its damage on society.

Basically, two arguments are made for the auto bailout, that the auto industry is so important and so tied into the rest of the economy that large-scale damage would occur if Detroit were to go under and that if the financial sector is rescued, why not the auto industry, too. Yes, Detroit is big and its demise would be very, very damaging to the rest of the economy. Many jobs are at stake, not only at the auto companies but also at their dealers and suppliers, and the pensions and health care of many others would be adversely affected by the closing of these firms. But no one is talking about closing down the Big 3 completely. Rather, through bankruptcy they would be more completely reorganized and have a better chance at gaining long-term viability. And, with regard to bailing out the banks, clearly, saving one sector of the economy, in this case, finance, is not a reason to save any other. The web of finance extends far and wide and literally affects everything economic. Its central role makes it different.

The auto industry is declining in the U.S. for many reasons, some of them due to the industry’s inflexibility and some of them due to bad macroeconomic and regulatory policies, such as an exchange rate that has fluctuated in a way that has made long-term planning impossible and CAFE standards that distorted its market. Whatever the reasons for the failures of the industry, bailing out the auto companies will only allow the management in place to continue to mismanage the industry and destroy more capital.

Rather than being “rescued” by the government, the industry should be left to find its own way in an extremely competitive world market. This means allowing it to strive to make a profit without the burden of needless regulations and government intrusions that always accompany any government “help” to a distressed industry.

06 November 2008

Why Arnold Kling is paranoid about sovereign debt


“Sovereign debt crises happen suddenly. One day, a country is paying normal interest rates and has full control over its fiscal and monetary policy. Then, investors lose confidence. Within days, the country has collapsed, and within weeks the savings of the majority of its people are wiped out, as the government either defaults or radically devalues its currency.

The election is not the source of my paranoia. I think that Obama is more likely to have advisers who understand the concept of currency crises.

What has me paranoid is the enormous surge of debt issuance that is coming. If enough international investors decide that they need a large risk premium to compensate them for funding this debt, we could find ourselves with a lot of Treasury bills to roll over in an environment where interest rates are 10 percent or more. The government will not be able to afford to pay those rates, and so something drastic will have to be done.

At that point, what are the government's options? Sharp spending cuts? My guess is that will be unthinkable (we might still be in a recession, after all). Print money to pay the debt? My guess is that option will not look attractive politically.

That leaves the option of declaring a national emergency and enacting what is known as a wealth tax or a capital levy. The idea is you undertake a one-time confiscation of assets and promise never to do it again. You hope that this has zero adverse incentive effects but brings in a boatload of money.

Only a relatively small portion of the population will be affected--and even they can be persuaded that the alternative is riot or revolution. So it can be the least bad alternative from the standpoint of political survival.”

Arnold Kling, “Why I am Paranoid”, EconLog Blog (6 November 2008).

http://econlog.econlib.org/


Arnold Kling is a noted economist who has worked for the Federal government and as a professor at several universities. He holds a Ph.D. in economics from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and worked as an economist in the Federal Reserve System from 1980 to 1986 and at Freddie Mac from 1986 to 1994. He is a founder and co-editor of EconLog, a popular economics blog that reflects Libertarian thinking.

Here are some figures related to the public debt of the United States. At the end of September the total national debt of the United States exceeded $10 trillion, or approximately $33,000 for every man, woman and child in the country. Of this amount, somewhat more than half, $5.8 trillion, is debt owed to the public (states, corporations, individuals, and foreign governments), the rest being held by government agencies (e.g., the Social Security Trust Fund and other government-controlled accounts). The figure for the national debt does not include unfunded Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid obligations, which are estimated to be some $60 trillion. Note that these estimates also do not include any debt incurred during the month of October and to date in November, months in which the U.S. government assumed the obligations of Freddie and Fanny (~$5 trillion) and has been spending hundreds of billions like a drunken sailor, and if the rhetoric coming out of Washington is any indication of the future, the sailor thinks the party has just begun.

The external debt of the U.S. is that portion of the national debt owed to foreigners. Approximately 25 to 30 per cent of the total debt, around $3 trillion (not counting the Freddie and Fanny obligations owed to foreigners), is in the hands of foreign nationals or foreign governments. It is difficult to ascertain how much of the debt is held directly by sovereign wealth funds, that is, held in state-owned investment funds under the control of other countries’ governments or their central banks. It is likely that it is a high percentage, approaching 50 per cent.

The risks to the United States of its external debt is three-fold. First, even if nothing extraordinary happens in the next few years the borrowing demands of the Federal government are expected to be huge. Much of the financing must come from foreign investors, who have expressed an increasingly unwillingness to lend. To entice them to do so, a higher interest rate will no doubt have to be paid on any new debt and any rollover debt, raising debt service costs greatly, even if it doesn’t create a crisis. Second, much of the debt is held by countries that -- how may I put it politely? -- do not hold the United States of America in highest regard and indeed may not have this country’s interests and welfare as a high priority on their national agenda. Indeed, much of the debt is held by countries that wish us the worst and we are now vulnerable to decisions they make and therefore we must be sensitive to their reaction our decisions on a host of foreign policy questions. And Third, financial crises can occur suddenly and without warning and for completely unexpected reasons. As we have seen in recent months, a crisis in one market may set off contagion to other financial markets, and credit everywhere dries up. Foreign exchange markets and prices of foreign assets are far more volatile than domestic markets, and simply stated while a crisis cannot be predicted we can say if it occurs it will be extremely bad.

Dr. Kling is noting a possibility that has been mentioned many times in Tdjs. The United States has placed itself in a very difficult position and made itself very vulnerable to events and decisions by its adversaries over which it has no influence. We can only pray that the foreign governments now controlling our fate realize that it is not only this country that will suffer if the dollar collapses and the U.S. is forced to take extreme measures to pay its debts.

The American people should ask how they allowed themselves to be put into this position, and, more importantly, how much sacrifice they are willing to make to eliminate the danger that now surrounds us.

02 November 2008

Vernon Smith on Barack Obama’s Economic Program


“I think the answer to Alan Reynolds's excellent question and article ("How's Obama Going to Raise $4.3 Trillion?," op-ed, Oct. 24) is that Barack Obama is not going to raise $4.3 trillion, and he is not going to perform on his rhetoric. He excels as a rhetorician -- common to both the great and the least of past presidents -- but performance cannot run on that fuel. Inevitably, I think his luster will fade even with his most ardent supporters as that reality sets in. We also have seen luster fade time after time with Republican presidents. The rhetoric of a smaller and less invasive government always leads to king-size performance disappointments. This weakness is as central to the reality of our political economy as are its strengths. With all its foibles, its strengths become transparent when you compare it, not with our various idealizations, but with the litter of human experiments in political economy that have delivered far more suffering and murder than human betterment to the citizens of those economies.

Of course it is entirely likely that Mr. Obama will succeed in going for higher business, capital gains and income taxes, but it is an economic illusion to think for a minute that this will benefit the poor. All our wars on poverty have been lost by failing to help the poor help themselves. Higher business taxes, which ultimately can only be paid by individuals anyway, will simply export more economic activity to the world economy. Higher capital gains and income taxes will primarily reduce savings and investment at the expense of greater future productivity, which is at the heart of cross-generational reductions in poverty. A dozen countries, including the third largest economy, already have zero taxes on capital gains, and eight of them score high on the Economic Freedom Index and high in gross domestic product per capita.

I favor making all individual savings and direct investments deductible from income for tax purposes. In that world there would be no need to make any distinction between ordinary income and capital gains. By adding a negative feature to such a net consumption tax, the poor would not only receive redistribution benefit, but have an incentive to save and accumulate capital. Some poor will see this as an opportunity to help themselves.

Vernon L. Smith”

Vernon L. Smith, “Only Economic Growth Can Provide Positive Change”, Letter to the Editor of The Wall Street Journal (31 October 2008).

http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB122541237504586451-lMyQjAxMDI4MjA1MjQwMTIyWj.html


Vernon Lomax Smith (1927-) is professor of economics at Chapman University School of Law and School of Business in Orange, California, a research scholar at George Mason University Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, and a Fellow of the Mercatus Center, all in Arlington, Virginia. Smith shared the 2002 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences with Daniel Kahneman. He is the founder and president of the International Foundation for Research in Experimental Economics and an Adjunct Scholar of the Cato Institute in Washington D.C.

Smith is right to note how we often compare the actual performance of an economy with some idealized system or notion of perfection that ought to be reflected in its performance. All economies are in reality mixed economies in practice and suffer from all the imperfections associated with the real world. They must grapple with real world problems and they must deal with the fact that people have very different objectives and very different judgments about the values society should promote. What is perfection to one person brings horror in the eyes of another. For this reason, any criticism people make must be discounted by the difficulties of leadership and the difficulties of the situation on the ground. And, needless to say, assertions that they or their party could do better are worthless unless they have a track record of good performance.

Critics of the contemporary economy of the United States and its performance under George Bush have been very critical of the man and the economy during his years as President. In macroeconomic terms, however, the performance of the economy under George Bush has not been bad at all: Following a slowdown that began before he became President and a setback caused by the tragedy of 9/11 the pace of growth recorded since 2002 compares favorably with other Presidents, and, similarly, rates of inflation and unemployment since the recovery are lower than other recent Presidents except for Clinton. The prevailing academic wisdom that living standards of the poor under Bush have declined is nonsense, as the average poverty rate for the Bush years is lower than that under Clinton and all other Presidents. History will argue that the financial crisis has been building for many years, as Robert Shiller points out in a recent New York Times article (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/02/business/02view.html), but Bush’s responsibility for the disaster is shared with the Congress, the Fed and the regulatory agencies. In terms of economics, Bush has done as well as other Presidents, and it reflects badly on his critics that they have distorted his record to the point of dishonesty.

And it is easy to assert with cool and self-righteous confidence, as Barack Obama does, that the man who has been grappling with the problems and produced decent results is somehow stupid and unequal to the task. Should he win the Presidency, Obama will find it much more difficult to deliver as it was to promise. He should pray that he does as well as Bush and that he will not have to suffer the mockery and disparagements and isolation that Bush has had to endure.

Barack Obama is an untried man advocating untested policies in an unprecedented situation. He proclaims “This is our time!” and “I will change the world!”. Dealing with real world problems, however, requires much more than words and by raising expectations beyond what any human being can deliver Obama has opened himself up to the very criticisms he has heaped on Bush.

Whether Barack Obama or John McCain becomes President he will need our prayers and support. For the problems before the country are immense and the man elected President is only a human being with greatly limited powers.